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Abstract 1	  
Intuitively, how we feel about potential outcomes will determine our decisions. Indeed, one 2	  
of the most influential theories in psychology, Prospect Theory, implicitly assumes that 3	  
feelings govern choice. Surprisingly, however, we know very little about the rules by which 4	  
feelings are transformed into decisions. Here, we characterize a computational model that 5	  
uses feelings to predict choice. Not only does the model perform better than existing value-6	  
based models, it also redefines some of their core assumptions. We reveal in three 7	  
independent samples that, contrary to conventional wisdom, losses do not have a larger 8	  
impact on explicit feelings than gains. Rather, loss feelings are weighted more when making 9	  
a decision. It are these relative weights that explain individual differences in decision-10	  
making. The results provide new insights into how feelings are utilized to reach a decision. 11	  
 12	  
 13	  
Keywords: decision-making, feelings, subjective well-being, value, utility, Prospect Theory 14	  
15	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Introduction 16	  
How would you feel if you received international recognition for outstanding professional 17	  
achievement? How would you feel if your marriage broke apart? Intuitively, answers to these 18	  
questions are important, as they should predict your actions. If the prospect of losing your 19	  
spouse does not fill you with negative feelings you may not attempt to keep the unit intact. 20	  
But how exactly do feelings associated with possible outcomes relate to actual choices? What 21	  
are the computational rules by which feelings are transformed into decisions? While an 22	  
expanding body of literature has been dedicated to answering the reverse question, namely 23	  
how decision outcomes affect feelings (Carter & McBride, 2013; Kassam, Morewedge, 24	  
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; McGraw, Larsen, 25	  
Kahneman, & Schkade, 2010; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Rutledge, Skandali, 26	  
Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Yechiam, Telpaz, & Hochman, 2014), little is known of how feelings 27	  
drive decisions about potential outcomes.  28	  
Here, we examine whether feelings predict choice and built a computational model that 29	  
characterizes this relationship. We turn to Prospect Theory (Fox & Poldrack, 2014; 30	  
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992) as a starting point in this 31	  
research. Prospect Theory was not derived by eliciting people’s feelings to predict choice, but 32	  
rather by observing people’s choices in order to estimate the subjective value associated with 33	  
possible outcomes. An implicit assumption of the theory, however, is that subjective value 34	  
(utility) is a proxy for feelings, which in turn govern choice; “humans described by Prospect 35	  
Theory are guided by the immediate emotional impact of gains and losses” (Kahneman, 36	  
2011). This suggests that if we measure a person’s feelings associated with different 37	  
outcomes, we should be able to generate that person’s utility function and use it to predict 38	  
their choices. While Prospect Theory is one of the most influential theories in economics and 39	  
psychology, this implicit assumption has never been empirically tested. Thus, we do not 40	  
know if and how feelings guide choice. 41	  
To address this question, in three separate studies (see Supplemental Material for replication 42	  
studies), participants reported how they felt, or expected to feel, after winning or losing 43	  
different amounts of money. We used those self-reported feelings to form a “feeling 44	  
function”; a function that best relates feelings (expected and/or experienced) to objective 45	  
value.  Next, we used this function to predict participants’ choices in a different decision-46	  
making task. Our findings were replicated in all three studies. 47	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An intriguing question is what such a “feeling function” would look like. One possibility is 48	  
that it resembles Prospect Theory’s value function, which relates the subjective value 49	  
estimated from choice data to objective value. First, for most people, the value function is 50	  
steeper for losses in comparison to gains. This results in loss aversion, such that the absolute 51	  
subjective value of losing a dollar is greater than that of winning a dollar. Yet, while losses 52	  
appear to “loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), we do not know whether 53	  
the impact of a loss on our feelings is greater than the impact of an equivalent gain. 54	  
Alternatively, it is possible that the impact of gains and losses on feelings is similar, but that 55	  
the weight given to those feelings differs when making a choice. Second, Prospect Theory’s 56	  
value function is convex in the loss domain while concave in the gain domain (resembling an 57	  
“S-shape”). The curvature of the function in both domains represents the notion of 58	  
diminishing sensitivity to changes in value as gains and losses increase. In other words, the 59	  
subjective value of gaining (or losing) ten dollars is smaller than twice that of gaining (or 60	  
losing) five dollars. This diminishing sensitivity results in risk aversion in the gain domain 61	  
and risk seeking in the loss domain, with individuals tending to choose a small sure gain over 62	  
a high but risky gain, but a high risky loss over a small sure loss. We examined whether our 63	  
“feeling function” was also concave for gains and convex for losses, implying that similar to 64	  
value, feelings associated with gains and losses are less sensitive to outcome value as gains 65	  
and losses increase. That is, the impact of winning (or losing) ten dollars on feelings is less 66	  
than twice the impact of winning (or losing) five dollars. 67	  
Once feelings were modeled using this “feeling function” we asked whether they can predict 68	  
choice. Understanding how explicit feelings relate to behavior has important real-world 69	  
implications for domains ranging from policy to industry.  70	  
 71	  
Methods 72	  
Subjects. Fifty-nine healthy volunteers (24 males, mean age 23.94y, age range 19-35y) were 73	  
recruited to take part in the experiment via the UCL Subject Pool. Sample size was 74	  
determined using a power analysis (G*power version 3.1.9.2; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 75	  
Buchner, 2007). Based on previous studies that have investigated the link between decision 76	  
outcomes and self-report feelings using within-subjects designs, effect sizes (Cohen’s dz) 77	  
ranged from .245 to .798, with a mean at .401 (Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann, 78	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2007; Kermer et al., 2006; Yechiam et al., 2014). A sample size of 59 subjects was therefore 79	  
required to achieve 85% power of detecting an effect size of .401 with an alpha of 0.05. Data 80	  
collection was therefore stopped after 59 subjects. Three subjects were excluded: one who 81	  
showed no variation at all in their feelings ratings, one whose data from the gambling task 82	  
were lost, and one who missed more than 50% of the trials in the gambling task. Final 83	  
analyses were run on 56 subjects (22 males, mean age 23.91y, age range 19-35y). With 56 84	  
subjects included, our post-hoc power to detect a .401 effect size was still 83.8%. All 85	  
participants gave written informed consent and were paid for their participation. The study 86	  
was approved by the departmental ethics committee at University College London. 87	  
Behavioral tasks. Participants completed two tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced.  88	  
1. Feelings Task. In the feelings task, subjects completed 4 blocks of 40 to 48 trials each, in 89	  
which they reported either expected (Fig. 1A) or experienced (Fig. 1B) feelings associated 90	  
with a range of wins and losses (between £0.2 and £12), or no change in monetary amount 91	  
(£0). At the beginning of each trial participants were told how much was at stake and whether 92	  
it was a win trial (e.g., if you choose the “good” picture, you will win £10) or a loss trial (e.g., 93	  
if you choose the “bad” picture, you will lose £10). Their task was then to make a simple 94	  
arbitrary choice between two geometrical shapes, associated with a 50% chance of winning 95	  
versus not winning (on win trials) or of losing versus not losing (on loss trials). On each trial 96	  
participants were told that one novel stimulus was randomly associated with a gain or loss 97	  
(between £0.2 and £12) and the other novel stimulus with no gain and no loss (£0). Each 98	  
stimulus was presented once so learning was not possible. There was no way for the 99	  
participants to know which abstract stimulus was associated with a better outcome. In fact, 100	  
the probability of sampling each amount was controlled to ensure that each gain and each loss 101	  
from the range was sampled twice in each block: on one instance this amount was 102	  
experienced as the outcome (win/loss) and on the other one the outcome was £0 (no win/no 103	  
loss). Participants reported their feelings by answering the questions “How do you feel now?” 104	  
(experienced feelings, after a choice) or “How will you feel if you win/lose/don’t win/don’t 105	  
lose?” (expected feelings, before a choice), using a subjective rating scale ranging from 106	  
“Extremely unhappy” to “Extremely happy”. In 2 of the 4 blocks (counterbalanced order) 107	  
they reported their expected feelings (Fig. 1A), and in the other 2 blocks, they reported their 108	  
experienced feelings (Fig 1B). Expected and experienced feelings were collected in different 109	  
blocks to avoid subjects simply remembering and repeating the same rating. The choice 110	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between the two geometrical shapes was simply instrumental and implemented in order to 111	  
have subjects actively involved with the outcomes.  112	  
 113	  
 114	  
Fig. 1. Experimental design. Participants completed two tasks in a counterbalanced order 115	  
(A,B): a feelings task where they reported (in different blocks) expected (A) or experienced 116	  
(B) feelings associated with winning, losing, not winning or not losing a range of monetary 117	  
amounts; and (C) a gambling task where they selected between a sure option and a gamble 118	  
involving the same amounts as those used in the feelings task. Feelings were modeled as a 119	  
function of value and this resulting feelings function F was used to predict choice in the 120	  
gambling task. For each trial, feelings associated with the sure option, the risky gain, and the 121	  
risky loss were extracted and entered in a cross-trials within-subject logistic regression 122	  
model. 123	  
 124	  
2. Gambling Task. Participants completed a probabilistic choice task (Fig. 1C) in which they 125	  
made 288-322 choices between a risky 50/50 gamble and a sure option. Importantly, all the 126	  
amounts used in the gambling task were the same as those used in the feelings task (between 127	  
£0.2 and £12), such that feelings associated with these outcomes could be combined to 128	  
predict gamble choice. There were 3 gamble types: mixed (subjects had to choose between a 129	  
gamble with 50% chance of a gain and 50% of a loss, or sure option of £0), gain-only 130	  
(subjects had to choose between a gamble with 50% chance of a high gain and 50% chance of 131	  
£0, or a sure, smaller, gain) and loss-only (subjects had to choose between a gamble with 132	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50% chance of a high loss and 50% chance of £0, or a sure, smaller, loss). In Prospect 133	  
Theory, these 3 types of choices are essential to estimate loss aversion, risk preference for 134	  
gains, and risk preference for losses, respectively. 135	  
Subjects started the experiment with an initial endowment of £12 and were paid according to 136	  
their choices on two randomly chosen trials (across both tasks) at the end of the experiment. 137	  
Feelings function models. The impact of outcome on feelings was calculated relative to 138	  
three different baselines: difference from the mid-point of the rating scale, difference from 139	  
rating reported on the previous trial (for experienced feelings only), difference from 140	  
corresponding zero outcome. These were calculated for each win and loss amount, for 141	  
expected and experienced feelings separately. For each subject, for each of the above 142	  
methods, feelings function models were then fit (ten for expected feelings and ten for 143	  
experienced feelings) to explain how feelings best relate to value outcomes: 144	  
Feeling Model 1:   𝐹 𝑥 =   𝜷𝑥 145	  
Feeling Model 2:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝑥,       𝑥 > 0𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔𝑥,            𝑥 < 0 146	  
Feeling Model 3:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷( 𝑥 )𝝆,           𝑥 > 0−𝜷( 𝑥 )𝝆,          𝑥 < 0 147	  
Feeling Model 4:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝑥 𝝆,           𝑥 > 0−𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝑥 𝝆,          𝑥 < 0 148	  
Feeling Model 5:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷 𝑥 𝝆𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 ,           𝑥 > 0−𝜷 𝑥 𝝆𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 ,          𝑥 < 0 149	  
Feeling Model 6:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝑥 𝝆𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 ,           𝑥 > 0−𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝑥 𝝆𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 ,          𝑥 < 0  150	  
Feeling Model 7:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷𝑥 +   𝜺,       𝑥 > 0𝜷𝑥 − 𝜺,            𝑥 < 0 151	  
Feeling Model 8:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝑥 + 𝜺,       𝑥 > 0𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔𝑥 − 𝜺,            𝑥 < 0 152	  
Feeling Model 9:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷𝑥 +   𝜺𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏,       𝑥 > 0𝜷𝑥 − 𝜺𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔,            𝑥 < 0  153	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Feeling Model 10:   𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝑥 +   𝜺𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏,       𝑥 > 0𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔𝑥 − 𝜺𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔,            𝑥 < 0  154	  
In all these models, 𝑥 represents the value (from -12 to -0.2 for losses and from 0.2 to 12 for 155	  
gains) and 𝐹 the associated feeling. The slope between feelings and values is represented by 156	  
the parameter 𝜷 estimated as a single parameter in all odd-numbered models, or separately 157	  
for losses and gains in all even-numbered models. If loss aversion is reflected in feelings, 158	   𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 should be significantly greater than 𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 and even-numbered models should perform 159	  
better overall. Similar to the curvature parameter of Prospect Theory value function, 𝝆 160	  
reflects the curvature of the feeling function, i.e. the fact that feelings become more or less 161	  
sensitive to changes in value as absolute value increases (Feeling Models 3 to 6). In Feeling 162	  
Models 5 and 6, the curvature is estimated separately in the gain and loss domains. If the 163	  
feeling function is S-shaped (function concave for gains and convex for losses) 𝝆 values 164	  
should be significantly smaller than 1. To ensure that a function with curvature fit the feelings 165	  
data better than a simple linear function with an intercept, Feeling Models 7 to 10 were 166	  
defined (as respective comparisons for Feeling Models 3 to 6), where ε represents the 167	  
intercept, or the offset (positive for gains, negative for losses) where feelings start for values 168	  
close to £0. All these models were estimated in Matlab (www.mathworks.com) using a 169	  
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure (Myung, 2003). Bayesian Information Criterion 170	  
(BIC) scores were calculated for each subject and model, and then summed across subjects 171	  
(see Supplemental Material for details). Lower sum of BICs for a given model compared to 172	  
another indicates better model fit.   173	  
Prediction of gambling choice. Feelings values from Feeling Model 3 (found to be the most 174	  
parsimonious model overall) were then used to predict choices in the gambling task. 175	  
Specifically, for each participant, the feeling associated with each amount was calculated 176	  
using Feeling Model 3 with that participant’s estimated parameters (𝜷 and 𝝆). Thus, for each 177	  
trial of the gambling task, a feelings value was obtained for the sure option, the gain and the 178	  
loss presented on that trial. A feelings value of 0 was used when the amount in the gamble 179	  
trial was £0. The probability of choosing the gamble on each trial, coded as 1 if the gamble 180	  
was chosen and 0 if the sure option was chosen, was then entered as the dependent variable of 181	  
a logistic regression (Choice Model), with feelings associated with the sure option (𝑆, coded 182	  
negatively in order to obtain a positive weight), the gain (𝐺, multiplied by its probability 0.5), 183	  
and the loss (𝐿, multiplied by its probability 0.5) entered as the 3 predictor variables: 184	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𝑃 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 11+ 𝑒![𝝎𝑺! ! !𝝎𝑮! ! !𝝎𝑳! ! ] 
Logistic regressions were run on Matlab using the glmfit function, using either expected 185	  
feelings (Choice Model 1) or experienced feelings (Choice Model 2). To determine whether 186	  
those modeled feelings predicted choice better than value-based models, 5 other comparisons 187	  
models were used to predict choice from values (Choice Models 3 to 7; see Supplemental 188	  
Material for details). 189	  
In order to be compared across conditions and subjects, weight values 𝜔 were standardized 190	  
using the following equation (Menard, 2004; Schielzeth, 2010): 191	  
𝜔!! = 𝜔! 𝑠!𝑠! 
where 𝜔!!  is the standardized weight value, 𝜔! the original weight for predictor variable 𝑥 192	  
obtained from the regression, 𝑠! the standard deviation of variable 𝑥, and 𝑠! the standard 193	  
deviation of the dependent variable 𝑦, here the binary choice values. Standardized weight 194	  
values were extracted from each regression and compared using repeated-measures ANOVA 195	  
and paired t-tests. 196	  
Replication and extension studies. Two separate studies were conducted to replicate the 197	  
findings and extend them to cases where the impact of a loss and a gain on feelings is 198	  
evaluated (i) within the same trial (Replication and extension study 1) and (ii) on the same 199	  
unipolar rating scale (Replication and extension study 2). These studies suggest that the 200	  
results are robust and not driven by these specific factors. See Supplemental Material for 201	  
details and results. 202	  
 203	  
Results 204	  
Our analysis followed two main steps. First we used participants’ reported feelings associated 205	  
with different monetary outcomes to build a “feeling function”. Specifically, we found the 206	  
best fitting computational model to characterize how feelings associated with different 207	  
amounts of gains and losses relate to the objective value of these amounts. Second, we tested 208	  
whether that model of feelings predicted participants’ choices on a separate task. Results of 209	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the main study are reported below and results of the replication studies in the Supplemental 210	  
Material. 211	  
Characterizing a “feeling function” 212	  
Feelings associated with losses and gains were elicited using one of two different scales and 213	  
the impact of losses and gains on feelings were computed using three different methods (see 214	  
Supplemental Material for details): as the change from the mid-point of the rating scale, as 215	  
the change from the previous rating, and as the change from the rating associated with zero 216	  
outcome (i.e., the rating associated with not winning or not losing the equivalent amount). 217	  
For all the models described below the latter baseline resulted in the best fit (Table S1). Thus 218	  
we report results using this baseline; however, the results are the same when using the other 219	  
two methods of calculating feelings (see Supplemental Materials for details).  220	  
We aimed to characterize a model that best fit feelings to outcome value. To that end, for 221	  
each subject ten models (see Methods for equations and details) were run to fit data of 222	  
expected feelings to outcome value and ten equivalent models to fit experienced feelings to 223	  
outcome value. The models differed from each other in two ways: with respects to their slope 224	  
parameter (𝛽) and to their curvature parameter (𝜌). If models with one 𝛽 parameter fit better 225	  
than models with one for gains (𝛽!"#$) and one for losses (𝛽!"##), that would indicate that 226	  
gains and losses affect feelings to different extents; if not that would indicate a symmetrical 227	  
no difference in the magnitude of influence. If models with a curvature (𝜌) fit better than 228	  
linear models with an intercept (𝜀) that would suggest that feelings do not increase linearly as 229	  
a function of outcome value, but that their sensitivity varies as outcomes increase, such that 230	  
the feeling of winning/losing £10 is more or less intense than twice the feeling of 231	  
winning/losing £5. Models were estimated using a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure 232	  
(see Methods for details). Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which penalises for 233	  
additional parameters, showed that the best fitting model (i.e. the lowest BIC value) for both 234	  
expected (Fig. 2A) and experienced (Fig. 2B) feelings was Feeling Model 3 (see Table S2 for 235	  
BIC and R2 values), which has one ρ and one β:  236	  
𝐹 𝑥 = 𝜷( 𝑥 )𝝆, 𝑥 > 0−𝜷( 𝑥 )𝝆, 𝑥 < 0         (1) 237	  
where x is the gain/loss amount (positive for gains and negative for losses) and F the 238	  
corresponding feeling.  239	  
This suggests that: 240	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(i) feelings’ sensitivity to outcomes gradually decreased as outcomes increase. Similar to 241	  
Prospect Theory’s value function, ρ was significantly smaller than 1 (expected feelings: 242	  
ρ=.512 ± SD .26, t(55)=-14.05, P<.001, Cohen’s dz=1.88, 95% CI=[.418;.558]; experienced 243	  
feelings: ρ=.425 ± SD .23, t(55)=-18.52, P<.001, Cohen’s dz=2.5, 95% CI=[.513;.637]), 244	  
indicating that the feeling function was concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss 245	  
domain. Graphically, we can observe in Fig. 3 that the magnitude of feelings associated with 246	  
£10 for example was less than twice the magnitude of feelings associated with £5.  247	  
(ii) neither sensitivity (β) nor curvature (ρ) differed for gains than losses. Equal sensitivity 248	  
suggests that when feelings associated with losses and gains are evaluated separately their 249	  
impact is symmetrical, such that losses are not experienced more intensely than gains. On the 250	  
surface, these findings contradict the notion of “loss aversion” as proposed by Prospect 251	  
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992). However, what 252	  
we will show later is that while losses do not necessarily impact feelings more than gains they 253	  
are weighted to a greater extent when making a choice (see Results section on pg 16). With 254	  
regards to curvature, a single ρ was more parsimonious than two separate ones for gains and 255	  
losses, suggesting that the extent of concavity for gains was equivalent to the extent of 256	  
convexity for losses. 257	  
Further support for point (i) came from the fact that all models with a curvature parameter ρ 258	  
(Feeling Models 3-6) were better fits, as indicated by lower BIC values, than corresponding 259	  
linear models with an intercept (Feeling Models 7-10). This was true both when comparing 260	  
BICs for models fitting expected feelings (BIC difference < -112) and experienced feelings 261	  
(BIC difference < -37) (Table S2). Further support for point (ii) came from the fact that 262	  
Feeling Model 3 had lower BICs than other curved functions with additional parameters that 263	  
fit gains and losses with separate parameters (Feeling Models 4-6, see Table S3) for both 264	  
expected and experienced feelings. In addition, the absolute impact of losses and gains on 265	  
ratings of feelings relative to a zero outcome revealed no difference (F(1,55)=0.01, P=0.92, 266	  
ηp2=.00018). 267	  
Impact bias increases with the amount at stake 268	  
Interestingly, comparing the functions for experienced and expected feelings revealed an 269	  
“impact bias” that increased with amounts lost/gained. The “impact bias” is the tendency to 270	  
expect losses/gains to impact our feelings more than they actually do (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, 271	  
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Specifically, the curvature (ρ) was smaller for experienced 272	  
feeling function relative to expected feeling function (paired t-test: t(55)=3.31, P=0.002, 273	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Cohen’s dz=.442, 95% CI=[.034;.138]), while there was no difference in sensitivity values (β) 274	  
(t(55)=0.65, P=0.52, Cohen’s dz=.087, 95% CI=[-.079;.155]). Thus, although both expected 275	  
and experienced feelings became less sensitive to outcomes as absolute values of loss/gain 276	  
increased, this diminished sensitivity was more pronounced in experience than in expectation. 277	  
As a result, for small amounts of money gained/lost people’s expectations of how they will 278	  
feel were more likely to align with their experience. However, as amounts gained/lost 279	  
increased, people were more likely to overestimate the effect of outcomes on their feelings, 280	  
expecting to be affected more by gains and losses than they actually were (i.e., the impact 281	  
bias (Gilbert et al., 1998)). Graphically, we can observe the growth of the impact bias in Fig. 282	  
3 as the increase in separation between the blue line (experienced feelings) and the more 283	  
extreme orange line (expected feelings).   284	  
 285	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Fig. 2. Feeling Models. BIC values, summed across all subjects, are plotted for ten models 286	  
fitting feelings to outcome value (see Methods for equations), separately for (A) Expected 287	  
feelings ratings and (B) Experienced feelings ratings. Feeling Model 3 was the most 288	  
parsimonious model, as indicated by lower BIC values for both expected and experienced 289	  
feelings. 290	  
 291	  
 292	  
 293	  
Fig. 3. “Feeling function”. Plotted are expected and experienced feelings ratings averaged 294	  
across participants for each outcome value, as well as best fitting Feeling Model 3. Average 295	  
beta (𝛽) across participants, which represents the slope of the function, was 0.857 ± SD 0.36 296	  
for expected feelings and 0.819 ± SD 0.37 for experienced feelings (paired t-test revealed no 297	  
significant difference between them: t(55)=0.65, P=0.52, Cohen’s dz=.087, 95% CI=[-298	  
.079;.155]). Average rho (𝜌), which represents the curvature of the function, was 0.512 ± SD 299	  
0.26 for expected feelings and 0.425 ± SD 0.23 for experienced feelings. Both 𝜌 values were 300	  
significantly smaller than 1 (t(55)>14, P<0.001, Cohen’s dz>1.87), consistent with an S-301	  
shaped function and indicating diminishing sensitivity of feelings to increasing outcome 302	  
values. 𝜌 was also significantly smaller for experienced relative to expected feelings (paired 303	  
t-test: t(55)=3.31, P=0.002, Cohen’s dz=.442, 95% CI=[.034;.138]), suggesting that the 304	  
“impact bias” grows with increasing outcomes. Error bars represent SEM.  305	  
 306	  
 307	  
Feeling function predicts choice better than value-based models 308	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Once we established a function that fit feelings to outcome value, we turned to the question 309	  
of how well those feelings predict choices, in particular how they are combined and weighted 310	  
to make a decision.  311	  
To answer this question we used the Feeling Model built above from the data recorded in the 312	  
first task to predict decisions made in a separate gambling task. To do so we conducted two 313	  
logistic regressions for each participant (one using expected feelings – Choice Model 1 – and 314	  
one using experienced feelings – Choice Model 2), where choice on the gambling task was 315	  
entered as the dependent variable (either 1 if the subject selected the gamble or 0 if the 316	  
subject selected the sure option) and feelings (predicted by Feeling Model 3) associated with 317	  
the options were entered as the independent variable. Specifically, using the participant’s β 318	  
and ρ from Feeling Model 3 we computed the feelings associated with each available option 319	  
multiplied by their probability. For example, if a participant was offered a mixed gamble trial 320	  
where s/he could either choose a gamble that offered a 50% chance of gaining £10 and a 50% 321	  
chance of losing £6 or a sure option of £0, we estimated the feelings associated with these 322	  
three elements multiplied by their probability: the feeling associated with gaining £10 323	  
[𝐹 £10 = 𝛽×10!×0.5]; the feeling associated with losing £6 [𝐹 −£6 = 𝛽×(−6)!×0.5] 324	  
and the feeling associated with getting £0: [𝐹 £0 = 0×1 = 0]. These were entered in the 325	  
logistic regression to predict choice (Choice Model). Each logistic regression thus resulted in 326	  
three weight parameters 𝜔, which reflected the weight assigned to feelings when making a 327	  
choice; one for gains (𝜔!), one for losses (𝜔!) and one for sure options (𝜔!).  328	  
Importantly, choice models using feelings as predictors (Choice Models 1 and 2) were 329	  
compared to five other regression models which predicted choice using: objective values 330	  
(Choice Model 3), log of objective values (consistent with standard economics models to 331	  
account for the curvature of utility – Choice Model 4), as well as three models derived from 332	  
Prospect Theory, where value was weighted for each subject with their loss aversion 333	  
parameter (Choice Model 5), risk aversion parameter (Choice Model 6), or both (Choice 334	  
Model 7) (see Supplemental Material for more details). To avoid circularity and ensure all 335	  
Choice Models were run on the same set of choice data, loss and risk aversion parameters 336	  
were estimated using half the choice data; then, all seven Choice Models, including those in 337	  
which we used extracted feelings rather than values, were run on the exact same test data, 338	  
made of the other half of the choice data. 339	  
Models of affective decision-making	  
	   15	  
Feelings, extracted either from the expected or experienced feeling function (Choice Models 340	  
1 and 2) predicted choice better than all value-based comparison models (Choice Models 3-341	  
7), as indicated by lower BIC scores (Fig. 4A), and higher R2 values (Table S4). Mean R2 342	  
values were indeed higher for both models predicting choice from feelings (R2=0.31 for both 343	  
Choice Models 1 and 2) than for comparison models (0.26<R2<0.30 for Choice Models 3-7), 344	  
thus consistent with the BIC comparison result. Running the split-half analysis 100 times, 345	  
with a different way to split the data on every simulation, revealed that models using feelings 346	  
predicted choice better than all 5 comparison models in 99 simulations out of 100, thus 347	  
confirming the reliability of this finding.  348	  
 349	  
Fig. 4. Choice Models. Seven logistic regressions (or Choice Models) were run to predict 350	  
choices on the gambling task, using either feelings derived from the “feeling function” build 351	  
using expected (Choice Model 1) or experienced (Choice Model 2) feelings as predictors, or 352	  
using value-based comparison models (Choice Models 3-7). (A) BIC scores summed across 353	  
subjects (smaller BIC scores indicate a better fit) show that derived feelings (both expected 354	  
and experienced) predict choice significantly better than all other value-based models. (B) 355	  
The resulting standardized parameters show that the weight of feelings associated with losses 356	  
is largest, followed by the weight of feelings associated with gains, with the weight of 357	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feelings associated with sure options smallest. This suggests that feelings associated with 358	  
losses are weighted more than feelings associated with gains. Error bars represent SEM. 359	  
Two-tailed paired t-tests: * P<0.05. 360	  
 361	  
Feelings associated with losses are weighted more than feelings associated with gains 362	  
when making a decision 363	  
Are feelings about potential losses and gains given equal weights when we deliberate on a 364	  
decision? Our feeling function indicated that the impact of a loss on our feelings was equal to 365	  
the impact of an equivalent gain. Yet, while losses and gains may impact explicit feelings 366	  
similarly, we find that these feelings are weighted differently when making a choice.  367	  
Specifically, 𝜔 parameters from our choice models, which predicted choices from feelings, 368	  
revealed a greater weight for feelings associated with losses (𝜔!) relative to gains (𝜔!) in 369	  
predicting choice (for expected feelings: t(55)=3.04, P=.004, Cohen’s dz=.406, 95% 370	  
CI=[.684;3.33]; for experienced feelings: t(55)=2.93, P=.005, Cohen’s dz=.392, 95% 371	  
CI=[.599;3.19]; Fig. 4B). Models that allowed different weights for losses and gains 372	  
performed significantly better than models that did not (Table S5).  373	  
Follow-up analysis revealed that this was true only in mixed-gamble trials, where losses and 374	  
gains are weighted simultaneously, but not when comparing gain-only and loss-only trials, in 375	  
which gains and losses are evaluated at different time points (different trials). Specifically, 376	  
we ran logistic regressions to predict choice from feelings separately for each trial type, and 377	  
then entered weight of feelings parameters into a two (trial type: mixed/non-mixed) by two 378	  
(outcome: loss/gain) repeated-measures ANOVA. This revealed a significant interaction 379	  
(expected feelings: F(1,55)=6.54, P=.013, ηp2=.106; experienced feelings: F(1,55)=7.46, 380	  
P=.008, ηp2=.119; Fig. S1), driven by a greater weight put on feelings associated with losses 381	  
relative to gains during mixed-gamble choices (expected feelings: t(55)=3.66, P=.001, 382	  
Cohen’s dz=.489, 95% CI=[1.67;5.71]; experienced feelings: t(55)=2.45, P=.018, Cohen’s 383	  
dz=.327, 95% CI=[.91;9.10]) but not during loss- versus gain-only trials (expected feelings: 384	  
t(55)=.82, P=.42, Cohen’s dz=.109, 95% CI=[-3.25;7.71]; experienced feelings: t(55)=.79, 385	  
P=.43, Cohen’s dz=.105, 95% CI=[-2.75;6.32]). In other words, only when potential losses 386	  
and gains are evaluated simultaneously (i.e. in the same gamble) are feelings about losses 387	  
weighted more strongly during choice than feelings about gains. Results of our first 388	  
replication and extension study supported this claim by showing that even when gains and 389	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losses are evaluated in the same trial during the feelings task, their impact on feelings does 390	  
not differ, but their weight on gamble choice does (see Supplemental Material for details). 391	  
To further tease apart the asymmetrical use of feelings associated with gains and losses in 392	  
shaping choice from the use of value alone, we ran another logistic regression (Choice Model 393	  
8, run on all trials regardless of gamble type) in which raw feelings (i.e. reported feelings 394	  
relative to baseline rather than those derived from the feeling function) were added as 395	  
predictors of choice in the same logistic regression as objective values themselves. This was 396	  
done to reveal the weight assigned to feelings in making a choice over and beyond the effect 397	  
of value per se, when the two compete. The results showed no difference in the weight 398	  
assigned to the value of losses and gains per se (t(55)<1.2, P>.23, Cohen’s dz<.17), only to 399	  
the weight assigned to the associated feelings (expected feelings: t(55)=3.59, P=.001, 400	  
Cohen’s dz=.479, 95% CI=[1.29;4.55]; experienced feelings: t(55)=2.28, P=.027, Cohen’s 401	  
dz=.307, 95% CI=[.197;2.89]). Again, this was only true for mixed gamble choices, not for 402	  
gain-only or loss-only trials where neither feelings nor values were weighted differently 403	  
between losses and gains (Table S6). This suggests that losses are not weighed differently 404	  
from gains; rather feelings associated with losses are weighed differently from feelings 405	  
associated with gains, emphasizing the importance of feelings in decision making. 406	  
This last conclusion raises the possibility that individual differences in decision-making could 407	  
be explained by how people weigh feelings when making a choice. Indeed, using the weights 408	  
from the above Choice Model 8 we show that individual differences in both loss aversion and 409	  
the propensity to choose gambles were directly correlated with the extent to which feelings 410	  
associated with losses were overweighed compared to gains while controlling for value 411	  
(correlation between loss aversion and loss-gain weight difference for expected feelings: 412	  
r(56)=0.56, P<0.001; for experienced feelings: r(56)=0.34, P=0.012; correlation between 413	  
propensity to gamble and loss-gain weight difference for expected feelings: r(56)=-0.61, 414	  
P<0.001; for experienced feelings: r(56)=-0.46, P<0.001; Fig. 5, see Supplementary 415	  
Information for loss aversion modeling). Specifically, subjects who weighed feelings 416	  
associated with losses more than gains were more loss averse and less likely to gamble.  417	  
This set of results suggests that the asymmetric influence of gains and losses on decision-418	  
making, as suggested by Prospect Theory, is neither reflected in expected nor experienced 419	  
feelings, nor in different weights assigned to value per se, but rather in the extent to which 420	  
feelings associated with losses and gains are taken into account when making a decision. 421	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 422	  
 423	  
Fig. 5. Individual differences in choice are driven by the relative weights of feelings. 424	  
Raw feelings (i.e. reported feelings relative to baseline) and objective values were combined 425	  
in the same regression model (Choice Model 8) to examine the extent to which feelings 426	  
predict choice while controlling for value. Each regression used either Expected (A,C) or 427	  
Experienced (B,D) raw feelings together with objective values of each of the 3 decision 428	  
options (Gain, Loss, Sure option), leading to 6 weight parameters in each regression 429	  
(𝜔!!""#$!"#,  𝜔!!""#$%&', 𝜔!!""#$%&',  𝜔!!"#$%,  𝜔!!"#$%,  𝜔!!"#$%). The difference between the weight of feelings 430	  
about losses (𝜔!!""#$%&') and the weight of feelings about gains (𝜔!!""#$%&') was then calculated for 431	  
each individual and each regression and plotted against ln Loss Aversion (A,B) (parameter 432	  
estimated for each individual from the choice data) and proportion of chosen gambles (C,D). 433	  
These correlations indicate that the greater weight a participant puts on feelings associated 434	  
with a loss relative to a gain when making a decision, the more loss averse (and less likely to 435	  
gamble) they are. Note that loss aversion and propensity to gamble are highly correlated, 436	  
therefore correlations in C and D are not independent from A and B, respectively, and are 437	  
displayed for illustrations purposes.   438	  
 439	  
 440	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 441	  
Discussion 442	  
The relationship between human feelings and the choices they make has occupied scientists, 443	  
policymakers and philosophers for decades. Indeed, in recent years numerous studies have 444	  
investigated how decisions and outcomes impact people’s feelings (Carter & McBride, 2013; 445	  
Kassam et al., 2011; Kermer et al., 2006; McGraw et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997; Rutledge 446	  
et al., 2014; Yechiam et al., 2014) and life satisfaction (Boyce, Wood, Banks, Clark, & 447	  
Brown, 2013; De Neve et al., 2015). Yet, the equally critical question of how people’s 448	  
explicit feelings impact their decisions has been relatively neglected. In this study, we 449	  
addressed this important question in a controlled laboratory setting and modeled how feelings 450	  
are integrated into decisions. We demonstrated that feelings drive the decisions people make. 451	  
However, the rules by which they do so differ from previously assumed. 452	  
Feelings were first modeled in a “feeling function” (Feeling Model), which was then used to 453	  
predict choices (Choice Model). Our Feeling Model predicted choice better than objective 454	  
values, and a unique contribution of feelings in the decision process was demonstrated. The 455	  
“feeling function” that best related feelings to value was revealed to be concave for gains and 456	  
convex for losses, similar to Prospect Theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 457	  
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and other non-linear utility functions (Bernoulli, 1954; Fox & 458	  
Poldrack, 2014; Stauffer, Lak, & Schultz, 2014; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This 459	  
curvature suggests that explicit feelings, similar to subjective value or utility, show 460	  
diminishing sensitivity to outcomes as the value of these outcomes increases (Carter & 461	  
McBride, 2013). In other words, the impact of winning or losing ten dollars on feelings is less 462	  
than twice that of winning or losing five dollars. 463	  
Our Feeling Model also revealed no asymmetry between gains and losses, suggesting that the 464	  
impact of a loss on feelings is not necessarily greater than the impact of an equivalent gain. 465	  
This was replicated in two separate studies extending the symmetrical impact of gains and 466	  
losses on feelings to cases where a gain and a loss were evaluated at the same time and when 467	  
the associated feelings about gains and losses are reported using the same unipolar scale 468	  
(McGraw et al., 2010). Nevertheless, loss aversion was still present in choice (see 469	  
Supplemental Material for estimates of loss aversion), consistent with Prospect Theory. 470	  
Importantly, when making a decision a greater weight was put on feelings associated with 471	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losses relative to gains. This finding suggests that losses may not impact feelings more 472	  
strongly than gains as previously implied, but rather that feelings about losses are weighted 473	  
more when making a choice than feelings about gains. Moreover, the amount by which 474	  
feelings associated with losses are over-weighted relative to gains in making a decision 475	  
relates to individual differences in loss aversion and propensity to gamble.  476	  
This finding resolves a long-standing puzzle by which loss aversion is often observed in 477	  
choice, but not necessary in explicit feelings (Harinck et al., 2007; Kermer et al., 2006; 478	  
McGraw et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997). We suggest that the asymmetric influence of gains 479	  
and losses on decision making, as suggested by Prospect Theory, is not reflected in expected 480	  
or experienced feelings directly, neither in different weights assigned to value per se, but in 481	  
the extent to which feelings about losses and gains are taken into account when making a 482	  
decision. Our result is consistent with the interpretation of an increased attention to losses 483	  
(Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). When losses and gains are presented separately they are 484	  
experienced in a symmetrical way. However, when they compete for attention, as is the case 485	  
in the mixed gambles, people may allocate more attention to the feelings they would derive 486	  
from the loss than from the gain, leading them to choose in a loss averse manner. Another 487	  
possibility is that people implicitly experience losses to a greater extent than gains (Hochman 488	  
& Yechiam, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), but this difference is not exhibited in explicit 489	  
reports. We also note that the monetary amounts used in the present study were relatively 490	  
small, raising the possibility that a loss/gain asymmetry in feelings would emerge for higher 491	  
amounts, as suggested previously (Harinck et al., 2007; McGraw et al., 2010). 492	  
Our findings also provide the first demonstration of an increasing impact bias with value. 493	  
Specifically, we found evidence for a general impact bias in feelings (also called affective 494	  
forecasting error), where people expect the emotional impact of an event to be greater than 495	  
their actual experience (Gilbert et al., 1998; Kermer et al., 2006; Kwong, Wong, & Tang, 496	  
2013; Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2013; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013; Wilson & 497	  
Gilbert, 2013). Interestingly, this impact bias was not constant, but increased with value. This 498	  
was due to a stronger curvature of experienced feelings relative to expected feelings. In other 499	  
words, as absolute value increases, sensitivity to value diminished more quickly for 500	  
experienced relative to expected feelings. This suggests that as people win or lose more 501	  
money, they are more and more biased towards overestimating the emotional impact of these 502	  
outcomes.  503	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Our modeling approach provides novel insight into how explicit feelings relate to choice. 504	  
Such understanding is both of theoretical importance and has practical implications for 505	  
policy-makers, economists and clinicians who often measure explicit feelings to predict 506	  
choice (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, & Rees-Jones, 2012, 2014). 507	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Supplemental Online Material 633	  
Models of affective decision-making: how do feelings predict 634	  
choice? 635	  
SI Methods and Results 636	  
Study groups 637	  
Participants were recruited in two different groups that were then collapsed in the analyses. A 638	  
group of 29 participants (20 females, mean age=23.2y) were tested on a first version of the 639	  
task, where each of the four blocks had 48 trials with different amounts (£0.2, £0.4, £0.6, 640	  
£0.8, £1, £1.2, £2, £4, £6, £8, £10, £12) that could be won, lost, not won or not lost. For 641	  
expected feelings participants were asked “how will you feel if you win/lose?”; and for 642	  
experienced feelings “how do you feel now?”. The rating scale ranged from 1 (extremely 643	  
unhappy) to 10 (extremely happy) and participants had to press a key (1 to 9 for ratings 1 to 9 644	  
and 0 for rating 10) to indicate their feelings. A second group of 30 participants (15 females, 645	  
mean age=24.5y) completed a slightly shorter version of the feelings task that had 40 trials 646	  
per block (10 amounts instead of 12: £0.2, £0.5, £0.7, £1, £1.2, £2, £5, £7, £10, £12) and 647	  
indicated their ratings by moving a cursor on a symmetrical rating scale, in which 0 was used 648	  
as a reference point. Specifically, for expected feelings they were asked “if 0 is how you feel 649	  
now, how will you feel if you win/lose?”; and for experienced feelings “if 0 is how you felt 650	  
just before the choice, how do you feel now?”. Ratings ranged from -5 (extremely less happy) 651	  
to +5 (extremely more happy). The first group of participants completed the feelings task 652	  
first, while the second group completed the gambling task first. The data (parameters and 653	  
model fits from the feelings function models, and from the regression models to predict 654	  
choice) did not differ between the two study groups, indicating that those features of the 655	  
design that varied between the two groups were not a significant factor. Data were therefore 656	  
collapsed for all the analyses reported in the main text, and study group was controlled for by 657	  
adding a dummy variable as a between-subject factor in all the analyses.  658	  
 659	  
Agency manipulation in the feelings task  660	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The instrumental choice present in the feelings task (i.e. the arbitrary selection between the 661	  
two abstract stimuli) allowed us to manipulate agency: on 2 of the blocks (1 with expected 662	  
feelings and 1 with experienced feelings) the participant made the choice between the two 663	  
stimuli, and in the other 2 the computer made the choice for the participant who had to 664	  
indicate the computer choice with a button press after it was made. There were no differences 665	  
in the data between own choice and computer choice blocks, therefore data was collapsed. 666	  
Even when making their own choices subjects had no control over the outcome, thus it may 667	  
not be surprising that feelings did not differ between own choice and computer choice. Note, 668	  
that the above relates only to the task in which we elicited feelings associated with outcomes 669	  
and not, obviously, to the gambling task.  670	  
 671	  
Estimation of Feeling Models 672	  
All ten Feeling Models were estimated using a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure in 673	  
Matlab. Given a Feeling Model 𝑓(𝑥,𝜃) with 𝜃 the set of parameters, 𝑥 the range of outcome 674	  
values, and 𝑦 the feelings data to be modeled, the residuals from the model can be written as: 675	   ℰ = 𝑦 − 𝑓(𝑥,𝜃)          (Eq. S1) 676	  
Assuming an appropriate normal distribution for the residuals, the likelihood of a given 677	  
residual ℰ! is: 678	  
ℒ ℰ! 𝜃,𝜎 = !!ℰ!!!!!!!!         (Eq. S2) 679	  
where 𝜎 represents the standard deviation of the residuals (an additional parameter to be 680	  
estimated). Then the fmincon function was used to find the optimal set of parameters (𝜃, 𝜎) 681	  
that minimizes the negative log likelihood (thereby maximizing the likelihood): 682	  
− log  ℒ = − log ℒ ℰ 𝜃,𝜎 = ℰ!!!!! + 0.5 log 2𝜋𝜎!!     (Eq. S3) 683	  
BIC scores were then calculated for each subject using the following equation that penalizes 684	  
additional parameters in the model: 685	   𝐵𝐼𝐶 =   −2 logℒ + 𝑘 log 𝑛         (Eq. S4) 686	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where logℒ represents the maximum of loglikelihood ℒ (estimated using equation S3 above), 687	   𝑘 the number of parameters in the model (including σ as an extra parameter), and 𝑛 the 688	  
number of data points (trials) that were fitted. 689	  
 690	  
Loss and risk aversion modelling 691	  
In order to assess loss and risk aversion, three models were estimated for each subject using 692	  
choice data from the gambling task and based on Prospect Theory equations (Fox & 693	  
Poldrack, 2014; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). The model was 694	  
estimated in Matlab using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. For each trial, the 695	  
utility (u) of each gamble was estimated using one of the three following equations: 696	   𝑢 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =   0.5×𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 0.5×𝜆×𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 (Eq. S5 - to estimate loss aversion only) 697	   𝑢 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =   0.5×𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛! + 0.5×𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠!  (Eq. S6 - to estimate risk aversion only) 698	   𝑢 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =   0.5×𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛! + 0.5×𝜆×𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠!  (Eq. S7 – loss and risk aversion together) 699	  
where 𝜆 is the “loss aversion” parameter: a 𝜆 value higher than 1 indicates an overweighing 700	  
of gains relative to losses during decision-making and a 𝜆 value lower than 1 the converse; 701	  
and 𝛾 is the “risk aversion” parameter: a 𝛾 value lower than 1 indicates diminishing 702	  
sensitivity to changes in value and results in risk aversion, while a 𝛾 value higher than 1 703	  
indicates risk-seeking.  704	  
These utility values were used in a softmax function to estimate the probability of accepting 705	  
each gamble (coded as 0 or 1 for each rejected or accepted gamble, respectively): 706	  
𝑃 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = !!!!!𝝁×𝒖(𝒈𝒂𝒎𝒃𝒍𝒆)       (Eq. S8)  707	  
where 𝜇 is the logit sensitivity or “inverse temperature” parameter, an index of choice 708	  
consistency for repeated identical gambles, equivalent to the maximal slope of a logistic 709	  
regression curve: higher 𝜇 values indicate more consistent choices. 710	  
The three models were used to estimate risk and loss aversion on half the choice data, in 711	  
order to predict choice from subjective utility on the other half of choice data (see 712	  
“Comparison models to predict choice” paragraph below). 713	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To predict individual differences in loss aversion from feelings, 𝜆 values were extracted for 714	  
each subject on the entire set of gambling choices using equation S5. They were then 715	  
correlated across subjects with the difference in how feelings about losses and feelings about 716	  
gains are weighted during choice (Fig. 5A-B). Across all participants, the average loss 717	  
aversion (𝜆) was 2.38 (±SD=2.19), significantly greater than 1 (t(55)=4.72, P<0.001, Cohen’s 718	  
dz=0.631, 95% CI=[1.797;2.97]). This indicates that loss aversion was present in choice. 719	  
 720	  
Methods of computing feelings 721	  
The impact of losses and gains on feelings were computed using three different methods: as 722	  
the change from the mid-point of the rating scale, as the change from the previous rating, and 723	  
as the change from the rating associated with zero outcome (i.e., the rating associated with 724	  
not winning or not losing the equivalent amount). For all ten Feelings Models the latter 725	  
baseline resulted in the best fit (Table S1), which is why we report results using this baseline 726	  
in the main text. However, we note that results were the same when using the other two 727	  
methods of calculating feelings. First, when we estimated Choice Models to predict gambling 728	  
choice from these feelings functions varying in their reference point, we replicated our 729	  
finding that these feelings predicted choice better than the five other value-based Choice 730	  
Models (Choice Model using expected feelings from scale mid-point: BIC=8884, R2=0.30; 731	  
Choice Model using experienced feelings from scale mid-point: BIC=8915, R2=0.30; Choice 732	  
Model using experienced feelings from previous trial feeling: BIC=8924, R2=0.30; value-733	  
based Choice Models: BIC>9025, R2<0.29). Second, we also find that feelings about losses 734	  
are weighted more than feelings about gains in predicting choice, independent of the baseline 735	  
used to calculate feelings (expected feelings from scale mid-point: t(55)=3.38, P=0.001; 736	  
experienced feelings from scale mid-point: t(55)=3.33, P=0.002; experienced feelings from 737	  
previous trial feeling: t(55)=3.20, P=0.002). This suggest that our findings do not depend on 738	  
the method of calculating feelings. 739	  
 740	  
Comparison models to predict choice 741	  
Choices were predicted from feelings using the previously built feelings function (Choice 742	  
Models 1 and 2). In order to examine whether this feelings function does a better job at 743	  
predicting choice than objective value, or choice-derived subjective utility, five other models 744	  
were tested (Choice Models 3 to 7). 745	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First a simple “Value” model (Choice Model 3) tries to predict choice simply by entering the 746	  
amounts available multiplied by probability, regardless of associated feelings parameters 𝛽 747	  
and 𝜌 or subjective utility parameters such as loss and risk aversion. For example, if the 748	  
choice is a mixed gamble between winning £10 and losing £6, the three predictors will be 749	  
£0*1 (sure option), £10*0.5 (gain), and -£6*0.5 (loss). 750	  
The second comparison model included log(Value) as predictors (Choice Model 4). Most 751	  
standard economic models account for the curvature of utility by taking the logarithm of 752	  
linear values. In this model and with the example above, the three predictors would be 753	  
computed as: 0 (sure option), log(10)*0.5 (gain), and -log(6)*0.5 (loss). 754	  
The three additional models predicted choice from Prospect Theory-derived subjective utility. 755	  
To do so, risk and loss aversion parameters were estimated on half the choice data using the 756	  
model described above (equations S5 to S8) for each subject. One model included value 757	  
weighted with the loss aversion parameter 𝝀 (£0×1, £10×0.5, −𝝀×£6×0.5; Choice Model 758	  
5); one included value parameterized with the risk aversion parameter 𝜸 (£0×1, (£10)𝜸×0.5, 759	   −(£6)𝜸×0.5; Choice Model 6); and the last model included both loss and risk aversion to 760	  
compute subjective values (£0×1, (£10)𝜸×0.5, −𝝀×(£6)𝜸×0.5; Choice Model 7). 761	  
All seven logistic regression choice models were run on the other half of the choice data, in 762	  
order to be comparable and to avoid circularity for the utility-based models. The gambling 763	  
task was designed such that each gamble was repeated twice; therefore, one occurrence of 764	  
each gamble was present in each half of the data. In addition, in order to ensure the reliability 765	  
of this split-half analysis, 100 simulations were run with a different data splitting on every 766	  
simulation. The loglikelihood of each model was extracted from the logistic regression and 767	  
BIC scores were calculated for each subject using equation S4. The sum of BIC scores across 768	  
subjects was then calculated for each model and each simulation, therefore allowing us to 769	  
report the number of simulations where the two feelings model performed better than the five 770	  
comparison models. 771	  
 772	  
Replication and extension study 1 773	  
Rationale. Because the feelings task reported in the main text elicits feeling ratings about 774	  
gains and about losses on separate trials, this design does not rule out the possibility that 775	  
losses and gains may impact feelings differently when they are evaluated at the same time.  776	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Methods. Thus, a follow-up study was run using exactly the same procedure as before, except 777	  
that on each trial of the feelings task (Fig. S2), the outcomes at stake included a gain, a loss, 778	  
and £0 (rather than gain versus £0 on some trials, and loss versus £0 on different trials). 779	  
Twenty participants were recruited and tested on this paradigm (12 males, 8 females, mean 780	  
age = 23.8 years, age range = 19-33). Ten participants completed the feelings task first, and 781	  
the remaining completed the gambling task first. Block order within the feelings task was 782	  
also counterbalanced across subjects. The range of amounts and rating scale used were the 783	  
same as in the second study group of the main study (see “Study groups” paragraph above). 784	  
Participants were told that each picture from the pair was associated with a certain probability 785	  
to win, lose, or get £0, and that these probabilities were different for each picture and not 786	  
shown to them. Therefore participants had to rate their feelings on every trial knowing that 787	  
each picture chosen could result in a gain, a loss, or a null outcome (£0). To maintain 788	  
consistency with the previous design, participants were only asked to rate their expected 789	  
feelings about 2 of the 3 potential outcomes on each trial. These were determined such that 790	  
each amount from £0.2 to £12 (win or lose) had at least one expected feeling rating 791	  
associated with it; then the other rating was selected randomly from the other two options. 792	  
The order of the two ratings was randomized. The impact of losses and gains on feelings 793	  
were computed using three different baselines as in the main experiment. For all ten feelings 794	  
models, using the change from the mid-point of the rating scale resulted in best fit of both 795	  
expected and experienced feelings data as indicated by higher R2 values and lower BIC 796	  
values, and was therefore used for all the analyses below. Note that in contrast with the main 797	  
experiment the zero baseline did not result in the best fit of feelings data. This is because in 798	  
the replication study the zero outcome was always associated with two possible outcomes 799	  
instead of one. Thus, the zero baseline was calculated differently – for each amount (for 800	  
example £2), the ratings associated with £0 were averaged across all trials where that specific 801	  
amount (£2) was at stake, regardless of third amount presented (which could be for example -802	  
£1, or -£10) – this conceptually and mathematically different approach resulted in different 803	  
model fits. 804	  
Results 805	  
Feeling Models. Feelings were fit with the ten Feeling Models described in the main Methods 806	  
to determine which function best relates feelings to value. If gains and losses impact feelings 807	  
differently when evaluated at the same time, then a Feeling Model with different parameters 808	  
(for example, a different slope  𝛽) for gains and losses, such as Feeling Model 4 or 6, should 809	  
fit the feelings data better. However, this was not the case; instead we replicated our previous 810	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finding showing that Feeling Model 3, with a single slope (𝛽) and single curvature (𝜌) 811	  
parameter for gains and losses, was the most parsimonious function that explains how 812	  
feelings relate to value (Fig. S3). This result replicates our previous finding that gains and 813	  
losses impact feelings similarly and extends to cases where the loss and the gain are 814	  
evaluated together.  815	  
Choice Models. To examine whether and how these feelings are weighed to predict choice, 816	  
feelings extracted from best fitting Feelings Model 3 were entered in a logistic regression to 817	  
predict choice on the gambling task. The same seven Choice Models were run as in the main 818	  
data, again replicating our finding that feelings predicted choice better than value-based 819	  
models (as indicated by lower BIC scores and higher R2 values for Choice Models 1 and 2; 820	  
Fig. S4A). Importantly, during choice, participants also weighed their feelings about losses 821	  
more than their feelings about gains (expected feelings: t(19)=2.41, P=0.027; experienced 822	  
feelings: t(19)=2.32, P=0.032; Fig. S4B). Finally, the extent to which feelings about losses 823	  
were weighed more than feelings about gains (in a separate Choice Model controlling for the 824	  
effect of value) was positively associated with individual estimates of behavioral loss 825	  
aversion (expected feelings: r(20)=0.54, P=0.014; experienced feelings: r(20)=0.44, P=0.052; 826	  
Fig. S4C).  827	  
 828	  
Replication and extension study 2 829	  
Rationale. A recent study (McGraw et al., 2010) has reported that measuring feelings on a 830	  
bipolar scale, like we do in our main experiment, resulted in no gain/loss asymmetry in 831	  
feelings, consistent with our findings, while using a unipolar scale (which represents the 832	  
magnitude of feelings only) does result in an asymmetry. The suggestion is that a unipolar 833	  
scale allows positive and negative feelings to be directly scaled relative to one another. We 834	  
thus reran our experiment using a unipolar scale.  835	  
Methods. We collected data on an independent group of 30 participants (15 males, 15 836	  
females, mean age = 24 years, age range = 18-35). The procedure was the same as in the 837	  
main study, except that a unipolar rating scale was used in the feelings task. A power analysis 838	  
indicated that a sample size of 30 would give us 99% power to detect an effect size similar to 839	  
the one observed in McGraw et al (d=0.76 for the difference between feelings for gains and 840	  
losses using the unipolar scale) at a threshold of p<0.05. Even if the actual effect size is lower 841	  
(d=0.5), achieved power would be 85%. 842	  
On experienced feelings trials the question was “How is this outcome affecting your feelings 843	  
now?”. On expected feelings gain trials subjects were asked “How would winning £X affect 844	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your feelings?” and “How would not winning £X affect your feelings?”, and on expected 845	  
feelings loss trials “How would losing £X affect your feelings?” and “How would not losing 846	  
£X affect your feelings?”. Participants responded by moving a cursor on a scale ranging from 847	  
0 (“No effect”) to 5 (“Very large effect”).  848	  
For analysis, ratings associated with losing and with not winning were coded negatively. 849	  
Analysis then proceeded exactly as in the main experiment.  850	  
Results 851	  
Feeling Models. As in the main experiment Feeling Model 3, with a single slope (𝛽) and 852	  
single curvature (𝜌) parameter for gains and losses, was the best model of the ten in 853	  
explaining how feelings relate to value (Fig. S5). This suggests that even when using the 854	  
same unipolar scale that allows scaling positive and negative feelings relative to each other 855	  
regardless of valence, gains and losses have a symmetrical impact on feelings. 856	  
Bayes Factor analysis. To corroborate the null effect of losses relative to gains on feelings a 857	  
Bayes Factor analysis was run on the feelings data using JASP (version 0.7.1; Love et al., 858	  
2015; Morey & Rouder, 2015). A Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with 859	  
domain (gain/loss) and amount (the range of 10 amount values from £0.2 to £12) as within-860	  
subject factors. The winning Bayesian ANOVA model included a main effect of amount, but 861	  
no effect of domain or domain*amount interaction, consistent with our Feeling Models result. 862	  
In particular, adding a main effect of domain made the model about 11 times worse 863	  
(BF[Amount Model over Amount & Domain Model]=10.87 for expected feelings and 10.62 864	  
for experienced feelings), indicating strong evidence for an absence of feelings asymmetry 865	  
between gains and losses (for correspondence between BF magnitude and strength of 866	  
evidence, see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Jeffreys, 1961). 867	  
Choice Models. As in the main experiment, feelings extracted from best fitting Feeling Model 868	  
3 predicted choice better than value-based models (as indicated by lower BIC scores and 869	  
higher R2 values for Choice Models 1 and 2; Fig. S6A). During choice, we again find that 870	  
participants weighted their feelings about losses more than their feelings about gains 871	  
(expected feelings: t(29)=2.29, P=0.030; experienced feelings: t(29)=2.08, P=0.047; Fig. 872	  
S6B). Finally, we also replicate our finding that the extent to which participant overweigh 873	  
their feelings about losses relative to gains (in an additional Choice Model where the effect of 874	  
value per se is accounted for) predict individual differences in behavioral loss aversion 875	  
(expected feelings: r(30)=0.62, P<0.001; experienced feelings: r(30)=0.63, P<0.001; Fig. 876	  
S6C).  877	  
 878	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With these additional studies, we replicate our findings in two further independent samples, 879	  
thereby confirming and strengthening our interpretation that gains and losses do not impact 880	  
feelings differently, but that when it comes to making a decision involving a potential loss 881	  
and a potential gain, people give more weight to feelings associated with the loss than with 882	  
the gain. 883	  
 884	  
 885	  
SI Figures and Tables 886	  
 887	  
 888	  
Fig. S1. Influence of gamble type on differential weighting of feelings associated with 889	  
losses versus gains. Logistic regressions were run to predict choice from feelings separately 890	  
for each trial type. Standardized parameter estimates representing the decision weight of 891	  
feelings were analyzed in a two (trial type: mixed/non-mixed gambles) by two (outcome: 892	  
loss/gain) repeated-measures ANOVA. Significant interactions for both expected (A) and 893	  
experienced (B) feelings indicate that more weight is given to feelings about a loss relative to 894	  
a gain only when the loss and the gain are evaluated simultaneously (i.e. in the same gamble). 895	  
Error bars denote SEM. Paired t-tests: * P<0.05. 896	  
 897	  
 898	  
 899	  
 900	  
 901	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 902	  
Fig. S2. Replication and extension study 1 – design of the feelings task. An additional 903	  
study was run to replicate the finding and test whether gains and losses impact feelings 904	  
differently when they are evaluated in the same trial. Task structure was similar to the main 905	  
study (main text Fig. 1), except that on each trial of the feelings task, 3 potential outcomes 906	  
were presented to the subject, always including a gain, a loss, and a null outcome (£0). The 907	  
design of the gambling task (main text Fig. 1C) remained the same. 908	  
 909	  
 910	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 911	  
Fig. S3. Replication and extension study 1 – “Feeling function” and Feeling Model fits. 912	  
Feelings data collected on the replication and extension study were fit using the same 913	  
procedure as the main study. (A) Expected and Experienced feelings ratings are plotted for 914	  
each outcome value as the average rating across participant. Error bars represent SEM. The 915	  
line representing best fitting Feeling Model 3 is also plotted. Average beta (𝛽) across 916	  
participants was 0.702 ± SD 0.24 for expected feelings and 0.669 ± SD 0.25 for experienced 917	  
feelings. Average rho (𝜌) was 0.474 ± SD 0.17 for expected feelings and 0.469 ± SD 0.23 for 918	  
experienced feelings (both significantly smaller than 1, consistent with diminishing 919	  
sensitivity of feelings to increasing outcome values: t(19)>10, P<0.001). BIC values, 920	  
summed across all subjects, for each of ten Feeling Models are plotted separately for (B) 921	  
Expected feelings ratings and (C) Experienced feelings ratings. This replicates the finding of 922	  
the main study (main text Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) that Feeling Model 3 was the most parsimonious 923	  
model, with no asymmetry in either the slope or curvature of the feeling function between the 924	  
gain and the loss domain, while the impact of gains and losses on feelings is evaluated during 925	  
the same trial. 926	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 927	  
 928	  
Fig. S4. Replication and extension study 1 – Choice Models. Using the same procedure as 929	  
in the main study (main text Fig. 4), choices on the gambling task were entered in logistic 930	  
regression models with expected feelings, experienced feelings, or various value-based 931	  
regressors as predictors. Replicating our findings, BIC scores indicated that derived feelings 932	  
predicted choice better than all other value-based models (A), with feelings about losses 933	  
weighted more during a decision than feelings about gains (B). When running an additional 934	  
Choice Model where both raw feelings and values were added as predictor of choice (similar 935	  
to main text Fig. 5), thereby allowing us to examine the predictive weight of feelings on 936	  
choice while controlling for value, we replicated our finding that the extent to which 937	  
participants overweigh their feelings about losses relative to gains during choice predict 938	  
individual differences in loss aversion (C). Two-tailed paired t-tests: * P<0.05. 939	  
 940	  
Models of affective decision-making	  
	   37	  
 941	  
Fig. S5. Replication and extension study 2 – “Feeling function” and Feeling Model fits. 942	  
Feelings data collected on the second replication and extension study were fit using the same 943	  
procedure as the main study. The only difference from the main study was the use of a 944	  
unipolar rating scale to measure reported feelings. (A) Expected and Experienced feelings 945	  
ratings are plotted for each outcome value. Error bars represent SEM. The line representing 946	  
best fitting Feeling Model 3 is also plotted. Average beta (𝛽) across participants was 1.339 ± 947	  
SD 0.36 for expected feelings and 1.509 ± SD 0.34 for experienced feelings. Average rho (𝜌) 948	  
was 0.299 ± SD 0.18 for expected feelings and 0.215 ± SD 0.16 for experienced feelings 949	  
(both significantly smaller than 1, consistent with diminishing sensitivity of feelings to 950	  
increasing outcome values: t(29)>20, P<0.001). BIC values, summed across all subjects, for 951	  
each of ten Feeling Models are plotted separately for (B) Expected feelings ratings and (C) 952	  
Experienced feelings ratings. This replicates the finding of the main study (main text Fig. 2 953	  
and Fig. 3) that Feeling Model 3 was the most parsimonious model, with no asymmetry in 954	  
either the slope or curvature of the feeling function between the gain and the loss domain, and 955	  
extends the finding to cases where the impact of losses and gains on feelings is reported on a 956	  
unipolar rating scale. 957	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 958	  
 959	  
Fig. S6. Replication and extension study 2 – Choice Models. Using the same procedure as 960	  
in the main study (main text Fig. 4), choices on the gambling task were entered in logistic 961	  
regression models with expected feelings, experienced feelings, or various value-based 962	  
regressors as predictors. Replicating our findings, BIC scores indicated that derived feelings 963	  
predicted choice better than all other value-based models (A), with feelings about losses 964	  
weighted more during a decision than feelings about gains (B). When running an additional 965	  
Choice Model where both raw feelings and values were added as predictor of choice (similar 966	  
to main text Fig. 5), thereby allowing us to examine the predictive weight of feelings on 967	  
choice while controlling for value, we replicated our finding that the extent to which 968	  
participants overweigh their feelings about losses relative to gains during choice predict 969	  
individual differences in loss aversion (C). Two-tailed paired t-tests: * P<0.05. 970	  
 971	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Table S1. Mean R2 values associated with each Feeling Model, separately for each method of 972	  
calculating feelings 973	  
 
Name of 
parameters 
Expected feelings Experienced feelings 
Model # Sum of BICs Mean R
2 Sum of BICs Mean R
2 
1 β 6625.7 0.720 6561.1 0.637 
2 βgain, βloss 6731.5 0.731 6695.0 0.648 
3 β, ρ 5716.1 0.804 5594.0 0.744 
4 βgain, βloss, ρ 5792.2 0.814 5628.4 0.758 
5 β, ρgain, ρloss 5793.4 0.814 5685.6 0.753 
6 βgain, βloss, ρgain, ρloss 5938.8 0.819 5758.4 0.764 
7 β, ε 5833.3 0.800 5674.7 0.742 
8 βgain, βloss, ε 5905.1 0.811 5757.2 0.752 
9 β, εgain, εloss 5947.7 0.808 5723.9 0.755 
10 βgain, βloss, εgain, εloss 6069.4 0.814 5851.3 0.761 
 974	  
The impact of outcomes on feelings was computed using three different methods: as the 975	  
change from the rating associated with zero outcome (i.e., the rating associated with not 976	  
winning or not losing the equivalent amount – zero baseline), as the change from the mid-977	  
point of the rating scale, or as the change from the previous rating. All feeling models were 978	  
then fit to these feelings data. For all feeling models the zero baseline resulted in the best fit. 979	  
Note, feeling change compared to previous trial feeling could only be computed for 980	  
experienced feelings, as actual feelings are not measured during expected feelings blocks. 981	  
Bold indicates the best fitting model. 982	  
 983	  
 984	  
 985	  
 986	  
 987	  
 988	  
 989	  
 990	  
 991	  
 992	  
 993	  
 994	  
 995	  
 996	  
 997	  
 998	  
 999	  
 1000	  
 1001	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Table S2. Feeling Models  1002	  
 
Number of 
parameters 
Name of 
parameters 
Expected feelings Experienced feelings 
Model # Sum of BICs Mean R
2 Sum of BICs Mean R
2 
1 1 β 6625.7 0.720 6561.1 0.637 
2 2 βgain, βloss 6731.5 0.731 6695.0 0.648 
3 2 β, ρ 5716.1 0.804 5594.0 0.744 
4 3 βgain, βloss, ρ 5792.2 0.814 5628.4 0.758 
5 3 β, ρgain, ρloss 5793.4 0.814 5685.6 0.753 
6 4 βgain, βloss, ρgain, ρloss 5938.8 0.819 5758.4 0.764 
7 2 β, ε 5833.3 0.800 5674.7 0.742 
8 3 βgain, βloss, ε 5905.1 0.811 5757.2 0.752 
9 3 β, εgain, εloss 5947.7 0.808 5723.9 0.755 
10 4 βgain, βloss, εgain, εloss 6069.4 0.814 5851.3 0.761 
Ten different models were fit to the feelings data in order to best explain its relationship to 1003	  
amount lost and gained (see Methods for exact equations). All models were run separately on 1004	  
expected and experienced feelings. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores were 1005	  
summed across subjects and R2 values averaged across subjects. Smaller BIC values and 1006	  
higher R2 values are indicative of better model fit. Note that BIC values cannot be directly 1007	  
compared between expected and experienced feelings models because the numerical values 1008	  
of the dependent variables are different. R2 alone cannot be used to determine the best fitting 1009	  
model as it does not account for the number of parameters. 1010	  
 1011	  
 1012	  
Table S3. Comparison between Feeling Model 3 and Feelings Models 4 to 6 1013	  
 Expected feelings Experienced feelings 
 Number of subjects (/56) BIC difference  
Number of 
subjects (/56) BIC difference  
Model 3 > Model 4 46 -76.1 42 -34.4 
Model 3 > Model 5 46 -77.3 44 -92.2 
Model 3 > Model 6 50 -222.6 47 -163.1 
Feeling Model 3 performed better than Feeling Models 4, 5, and 6 with additional 1014	  
parameters. The table shows the number of subjects for which Model 3 performed better than 1015	  
the compared model, as well as the statistics for the BIC difference between the two models 1016	  
(BICmodel3 – BICcomparison model). Negative values indicate that Feeling Model 3 was more 1017	  
parsimonious (had a lower BIC). 1018	  
 1019	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Table S4. Predictive value of Choice Models 1020	  
Model # Predictor of choice Pseudo R2  
1 Expected feelings  0.31  
2 Experienced feelings 0.31  
3 Log(Value) 0.30  
4 Value  0.26  
5 Value & Loss aversion  0.27  
6 Value & Risk aversion  0.27  
7 Value, Loss & Risk aversion 0.28  
Choice Models using feelings derived from each subject’s feeling function predicted choice 1021	  
better than Choice Models using value or value-derived functions. Note that all Choice 1022	  
Models were run on the exact same half of the choice data and that feeling and value 1023	  
functions were extracted from separate, independent data. Therefore, these Choice Models 1024	  
are directly comparable. Given that all models have the same number of parameters (𝜔! , 𝜔! 1025	  
and 𝜔!, representing the weights associated with gain, loss and sure option on choice, 1026	  
respectively), higher pseudo R2 value indicate better model fit. 1027	  
 1028	  
 1029	  
 1030	  
Table S5. Choice Models where losses and gains are weighted differently perform better  1031	  
 Expected Feelings Experienced Feelings 
 BIC R2 BIC R2 
Losses and gains weighted 
differently (ωS, ωG, ωL) 
17092 0.30 17156 0.30 
Losses and gains weighted 
together (ωS, ωGL) 
19594 0.18 19519 0.18 
Separate logistic regressions models were run on all choice trials to predict choice from 1032	  
feelings (either expected or experienced). Specifically, to demonstrate that feelings for losses 1033	  
and feelings for gains had a different weight on choice, choice models where losses and gains 1034	  
are weighed differently were compared to choice models where both losses and gains are 1035	  
given the same weight ωGL. This revealed that choices are predicted significantly better when 1036	  
feelings for losses and feelings for gains are assigned different weights. 1037	  
 1038	  
 1039	  
 1040	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Table S6. Weight of feelings on choice, while controlling for value, separated by gamble 1041	  
type 1042	  
 Expected feelings Experienced feelings 
 Mixed gambles 
Gain/Loss-
only gambles 
Mixed 
gambles 
Gain/Loss-
only gambles 
Weight of feelings about gains on 
choice, controlling for value (±SD) 
-0.202 
(±6.01) 
1.976  
(±5.92) 
0.388 
(±4.25) 
3.045 
(±13.51) 
Weight of feelings about losses on 
choice, controlling for value (±SD) 
4.017 
(±8.11) 
2.246 
(±4.43) 
2.671 
(±5.14) 
0.029  
(±6.34) 
T-test Loss vs Gain 
t(53)= 2.843 0.302 2.709 1.522 
P= 0.006 0.763 0.009 0.134 
Both raw feelings (i.e. reported feelings relative to baseline rather than those derived from the 1043	  
feeling function) and objective values were added as predictor of gambling choice in the 1044	  
same logistic regression, separately for each gamble type. The weights of feelings about gains 1045	  
and losses were extracted from each regression, averaged across subjects, and compared 1046	  
using a paired t-test. Data from two participants were excluded because the logistic regression 1047	  
models could not be fit and resulted in aberrant parameter values. 1048	  
 1049	  
